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ABSTRACT
Our research objective was to analyze known vulnerabilities and exploits of 
several commercial off the shelf (COTS) small unmanned aircraft systems 
(sUAS), identify new vulnerabilities and exploits, develop risk assessments for 
each sUAS, and relate our findings to the Department of Defense’s use of sUASs. 
The first step of our research was a comprehensive literature review of known 
exploits and vulnerabilities of sUAS. Second, we completed penetration testing on 
the sUAS to identify new exploits or vulnerabilities. Utilizing risk assessment 
models such as the DREAD computer-security model, our team analyzed various 
tested COTS sUAS by applying the model to each sUAS. Finally, after identifying 
vulnerabilities, risk assessment scores, and countermeasures, we described the 
importance of the application of risk assessments to the U.S. Navy’s increasing 
use of sUAS for reconnaissance, surveillance, and intelligence operations.
RESULTS
Each sUAS had multiple vulnerabilities. Since each sUAS connected to Wi-Fi in 
some way they were all vulnerable to deauthentication attacks that exploited this 
connection. The Parrot AR 2.0 proved to have the most vulnerabilities that we were 
able to exploit. Others, like the Holy Stone that connected with both Wi-Fi and RF, 
had far fewer vulnerabilities we exploited. Due to limitations such as the 
experiment’s time frame, legality, and available technology, we were not able to 
perform all possible attacks on each sUAS. Table 1 shows the 
overall vulnerability of each sUAS to the different attacks that we were able 
to perform.
INTRODUCTION
Understanding vulnerabilities—and, potentially, exploits—will become 
increasingly important for the DoD from an offensive and defensive perspective 
as insurgents, terrorists, violent extremist organizations (VEOs) and other malign 
actors increasingly use sUAS for intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and 
general force disruption (Craiger & Zorri, 2019). The question arises: since the 
DoD has sufficient kinetic weapons to eliminate a hostile sUAS, is there a need to 
physically destroy an sUAS? A comparable situation arises when a DoD force 
encounters combatant computers on the battlefield, which in many cases, are 
confiscated and analyzed for potential intelligence on combatant plans or previous 
actions. In the same vein, sUAS can store potential intelligence data 
including videos, photographs, waypoints, previous locations as demonstrated 
through GPS, etc. which can be analyzed from retrieved drones in the field. The 
ability to perhaps gracefully ground a combatant sUAS allows forces to 
potentially analyze combat-relevant information. Ultimately, there is an 
increasing need to secure these aircraft from any form of potential attack, be it 
kinetic or cyber. The sUAS consists of the operating system , the 
network connection, and the ground control station which consists of the 
controller and the pilot in command (PIC). Figure 1 shows this system. Each 
component has vulnerabilities that can be exploited.
CONCLUSION
The DoD and malign actors are increasingly making use of sUAS so 
it has become more important to understand the vulnerabilities 
sUAS possess have from an offensive and defensive perspective. 
Since sUAS are essentially flying computers, they will always have some level 
of vulnerability as all computers systems do. By understanding the vulnerabilities 
and exploits the DoD can secure their own sUAS to the best of their ability and 
attack the sUAS of malign actors. This platform for combat is here to stay and 
will only become more popular as technology advances.





The team will use the MITRE ATT&CK matrix, among other technical jargon, to 
follow a unified language when discussing the penetration testing techniques 
conducted on the sUAS researched: from initial access to impact of exploitation. 
The team will focus on identifying vulnerabilities within the supplied sUAS: 
the Elanview Cicada K, the Holy Stone HS100 Navigator, 
the Parrot AR.Drone 2.0, which is shown in Figure 2, the Parrot BeBop 2.0, 
the DJI Tello which is shown in Figure 3, and the DJI Phantom 4.. The testing will 
be limited to Wi-Fi enabled sUASs because of time constraints. However, within 
this subgroup of sUAS, various means will be explored to manipulate 
the sUAS. These include testing the controller (smartphone applications), the 
communication methods (the services offered on the network), and 




Holy Stone​ Cicada K​
Deauthentication​ Vulnerable​ Vulnerable​ Vulnerable​ Vulnerable​
Remote Access​ Vulnerable​ Not Vulnerable​ Vulnerable​ Not Vulnerable​
Network Monitoring​ Vulnerable​ Vulnerable​ Vulnerable​ Vulnerable​
Upload Files​ Vulnerable​ Vulnerable​ Not Vulnerable​ Not Vulnerable​
Download Files​ Vulnerable​ Vulnerable​ Not Vulnerable​ Not Vulnerable​
Intercept 
Video Stream​
Vulnerable​ Not Vulnerable​ Not Vulnerable​ Not Vulnerable​
Manipulate 
C2 Stream​
Vulnerable​ Not Vulnerable​ Not Vulnerable​ Not Vulnerable​
Signal Jamming​ Vulnerable​ Vulnerable​ Vulnerable​ Vulnerable​
GNSS Spoofing​ Vulnerable​ Vulnerable​ Vulnerable​ Vulnerable​
Figure 1. Components of an sUAS
Figure 2. Parrot AR Drone 2.0
Figure 3. DJI Tello
Table 1. Results of vulnerablilities found in each sUASCITATIONS
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